This paper investigates the socio-economic determinants of four stages of borrowing process of the Jordanian microfinance market. The equations and functions corresponding to the stages of the borrowing process are estimated using a sample of 474 microentrepreneurs. The main results are as follow: variables that reflect the repayment ability are the main determinants of credit rationing in the microfinance market; religious beliefs, social responsibilities, availability of local microfinance providers, application costs, level of knowledge about microfinance providers significantly affect the borrowing process of microentrepreneurs. Credit rationing is found to be a problem for some applicants, but not for the majority.
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Introduction
In many developing countries, mobilization of capital through financial intermediaries is still not fully developed. Short-term loan (credit), rather than long-term loan (bonds) and equities (stocks), is their major source of capital mobilization. Microentrepreneurs are mostly involved in short-term credit markets. Because of potential default risk associated with credit contracts, lenders usually screen loan applications on the basis of borrowers' intention and ability for repayment. Loan contracts, therefore, need to include both price (interest rate) and non-price provisions (collateral, market interlinkage, etc.) as appropriate incentives for loan repayment (Tang, 1995) . Lenders occasionally apply non-price rationing mechanisms based upon the attributes of the borrower and the business they finance. However, distinguishing quantity rationed borrowers (those who have a positive demand at the ongoing contract terms) from price rationed individuals (those who have zero demand) is impossible without additional information. Because the microentrepreneurs have been found to be willing to pay higher interest rate 1 , question of price rationing in the micro finance sector is virtually non-existent. Therefore, all microentrepreneurs basically face a binding supply constraint. Thus, the observed loan amount provides full information about the supply conditions. Quantity rationing may take the form of lenders offering an applicant a loan amount less than demanded or completely rejecting the loan demand. Unless further information is available, it is a difficult task to identify whether the market has cleared for a particular borrower or whether the supply is strictly less than demand or equal to zero. To overcome the difficulty, one needs to collect information directly by designing a survey mechanism that permits 2 full sample separation. Under this type of survey mechanism, respondents are asked qualitative questions that are designed to identify both the supply as well as demand conditions and the rationing mechanism for each individual respondent. This approach has been followed by Jappelli (1990) , Zeller (1994) , Baydas et al. (1994) and Crook (2001) . For example, Jappelli (1990) has estimated the determinants of a borrower being liquidity constrained and has used data in which constrained individuals are observable. Crosssectional data were used to assess the characteristics of credit-constrained households in the US economy by explicitly linking their existence to credit market imperfections and their personal characteristics. The data, drawn from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), provides information on individuals whose request for credit had been rejected by financial intermediaries. A logit model was developed in which both borrowers' and lenders' behaviours jointly determined the probability that a borrower was rationed in credit markets. However, he excluded the partially rationed borrowers who obtained a loan amount less than their demand and also disregarded the determinants of applying for a loan and its size. Later on, Zeller's (1994) univariate probit model based on a household survey in Madagascar had included the determinants of applying for a loan and its size, although he failed to incorporate some major determinants of the borrowing process (demand and supply). Using a randomly selected sample survey of participants in Ecuador's micro enterprise programs in 1990, Baydas et al. (1994) have also incorporated some major determinants of credit rationing model, but they excluded all the partially rationed borrowers by assuming that their loan applications had been rejected.
Like Jappelli (1990) and Zeller (1994) , Crook (2001) analyzes the determinants of being credit constrained. Using data for 1990-1995 from the latest version of the Survey of Consumer, he investigates the factors that affect a household being rejected or discouraged from applying for credit. Like Baydas et al. (1994) , he incorporates some determinants of household's demand for credit. A univariate probit model with standard error corrected for sampling weights is used to examine the determinants of being credit constrained, while a bivariate probit model followed by two stage least squares selection model was used to examine the demand for credit.
It is noteworthy that all the above mentioned studies have ignored a frequently observed case of quantity rationing, that is, they have excluded the partially rationed borrowers who apply for a loan but obtain a loan amount less than their demand. They also lack a thorough quantitative analysis of borrowers' behaviour before and after they make decision to enter credit markets. The present authors would like to rectify these shortcomings by providing a comprehensive analysis of the borrowing process of the microentrepreneurs in order to have a clear understanding of factors that affect the behaviour of both borrowers and lenders. After dividing the borrowing process into four stages, we separate out the stage specific factors in the following order: factors that affect the probability of applying for credit, factors that affect demand for credit, factors that affect the probability of being rationed, and factors that affect the supply of credit for specific borrowers. The present study also examines if additional non-economic variables such as religious beliefs, social events and associated social responsibilities do play an important role in the borrowing process of microentrepreneurs in an Islamic country like Jordan. After introducing our model framework of the borrowing process in Section 2, we discuss our survey design and method in Section 3. The econometric estimation methods involving four stages of the borrowing process and estimation results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. A conclusion is provided in the final section.
Model framework to analyze the borrowing process
An individual participates in credit markets as a borrower, when he or she has a demand for credit. The borrowing process consists of four sequential stages. At the first stage, an individual has to decide whether to apply for a loan or not. If the individual has a lack of demand for credit and therefore chooses not to apply for a loan, the borrowing process in relation to the individual does not arise. But, if the individual chooses to apply for a loan at stage one, 3 he or she has to decide on the amount of the loan in stage two. At stage three, the lender receives the loan application, assesses the creditworthiness of the applicant and then makes a decision whether to approve the loan or not. Depending on the lender's selection criteria and the creditworthiness of the applicant, the lender determines the maximum amount of loan in stage four. When the lender grants the borrower less than the loan demand, credit rationing arises. The following models represent the different stages of the borrowing process.
Stage One: An individual decides whether to apply for a loan or not
Function (1) relates the determinants to the probability of an individual applying for a loan: : random disturbance assumed to be independent of X 1 .
Stage Three: The lender decides whether to approve the loan demand or not
Function (3) relates the determinants to the probability that an applicant's loan demand will be rationed by a lender: : random disturbance assumed to be independent of X 2 .
The above equations and functions are to be estimated using survey data collected at the regional levels of Jordan.
The survey
Surveys carried out in Jordan often have samples designed for representatives at the regional levels (North, Central and South) rather than the sub-regional or governorate levels. Mostly, closed questions method has been adopted in the questionnaire; some open-ended questions have also been used in order to explore additional information. The questionnaire has been relatively simple in order to suit the educational levels of the respondents. The total number of completed questionnaires received by the authors was 682 (90.9 percent), out of which 474 responses (63.2 percent) have been used for analysis. As Table  1 below shows, the response rate is highest in the Central region (92 percent), followed by the Northern region (89.9 percent) and the Southern region (87.3 percent). However, the percentage of usable responses has been highest in the Southern region. The gender composition of the unemployed respondents shows that 31.9 percent (59 out of 185) are male and 68.1 percent (126 out of 185) are female. About 48.3 percent of the respondents report that they are head of the household. This percentage exceeds the percentage of married respondents which indicates that some of the single respondents are the main providers for their families. As expected, 60.6 percent of the men (174 out of 287) are heads of the household and main providers of the family compared with only 29.4 percent of the women (55 out of 185). The respondents' monthly income range from JD25 to JD1100, about 55 percent (261 out of 474) report earning less than the average of JD232. On the other hand, the respondents' monthly expenditures range from JD20 to JD976 with an average of JD236. These figures indicate that 57 percent spend less than the average, 61.6 percent spend more than their income and only 19.8 percent save an average of less than JD100 per month. Among six different major networks of credit sources available to the respondents, the informal sources are the most preferable followed by the microfinance providers ( Table 2) . About 20 percent of respondents report that they have no need for credit. 
Respondents' Borrowing Behaviour in Microfinance Market
The questionnaire has been prepared to investigate the respondents' knowledge of microfinance providers (governmental and non-governmental) and how religious beliefs and social responsibilities affect their borrowing behaviour. As a measure of respondents' knowledge of the microfinance providers, we have decided to select those who have reported that they knew more than 10 out of 20 nominated microfinance providers 3 . About 26. percent (127 out of 474) reported that they knew about more than 10 of these providers. Barriers facing microentrepreneurs obtaining credit are reported. Religious beliefs are the most frequent barrier, followed by lack of information on alternative sources of credit, and lack of experience in establishing micro enterprises (Table 3) . As to the demand for micro credit, about 45.6 percent of the total samples have applied for a loan from one or more of the microfinance providers. The number of applications range from one to three applications: about 75 percent for one loan, 18.5 percent for two loans, and the remainder for three loans. About 58.8 percent of all applicants obtained one loan approval, 12 percent obtained two loan approvals, while 28.2 percent did not receive any loan approvals. Interestingly, about 66 percent of the total sample report that Islamic beliefs affect their willingness to apply for a loan from a microfinance provider. Moreover, application fees (78.9 percent) and social events and responsibilities (49.2 percent) are reported as factors affecting the respondents' borrowing behaviour in the microfinance market. About 46.6 percent of the total sample report having at least one local microfinance Jordan Cooperation Organization (JCO), Social Security Net (SSN), and Queen Alia Fun (QAF).
provider. The availability of any of these providers in local seems to increase the willingness of 31.4 percent of respondents to apply for micro credit. In relation to the most recent loan application, the loan amounts that have been requested ranges from JD500 to JD10000. Only 12 percent of the applicants have requested less than JD1000, 57.9 percent have requested between JD1000 and JD3000, and the rest have requested more than JD3000. Despite the fact that all applicants have expected loan approvals, only 63.9 percent of the applications have been approved. About 58 percent (80 out of 138) have received the exact amount requested, 42 percent have been partially rationed (received less than loan demand), and 36.1 percent have been rejected. The loan amount approved ranges from JD500 to JD5000 with an average of JD2185 at an average interest rate. These loans have been granted for a period ranging from one to at most eight years of six percent. More than half of the borrowers (52.3 percent) have been granted more than four years to repay their loans. Moreover, 61.6 percent have been granted a grace period which ranges from three to 24 months. Purposes of the loan differ between respondents. About 51.4 percent of the borrowers (71 out of 138) report using part of the loan for production activities, 12.3 percent for social events, 4.3 percent for health expenses, 14.5 percent for consumption needs, 4.3 percent for educational needs, 26.1 percent for the repayment of other loans, and 63.8 percent for establishing new microenterprises.
As expected, 99.1 percent (214 out of 216) of the loans were secured against some kind of collateral with values ranging from JD1000 and JD20000 and exceeding the loan amounts requested. Many respondents report securing their loan by financial collateral such as a bank account and salary (48.1 percent), guarantors (31 percent), physical collateral (17.6 percent), machinery (0.9 percent) and business licence (7.4 percent). Finally, those who did not apply for any loans from microfinance providers report many reasons in descending order ( Table 4) . 
The estimation methods
The dependent variables in function (1) and function (3) are binary variables that take zero-one value, while those in equation (2) and equation (4) are quantitative variables. Accordingly, methods of estimation of the two groups of equations are different as shown below.
Binary dependent variables: PROBIT models
Estimating choice models using the usual least squares estimation method is not the best choice. One problem with the Linear Probability Model (LPM) is that the error is heteroskedastic--variance of the error term varies from one observation to another. Moreover, the least squares method yields unreliable values of probability, less than zero or more than one, due to the assumption of linearity between the probability and the explanatory variables.
The probability that an event occurs is non-linear and hence can be estimated by a method called PROBIT. 4 The PROBIT specifications are designed to analyze the qualitative data reflecting a choice between two alternatives. It provides a way of qualifying the relationship between the individual characteristics in addition to other explanatory variables and the probability of choosing an alternative. Estimating the PROBIT model is performed by maximizing the likelihood function with respect to all coefficients. The maximization requires an iterative method, but in most cases the algorithm will operate smoothly, because the PROBIT model likelihood function is very well behaved (Hill et al., 2001) . The EVIEWS software package is used to estimate the PROBIT models of functions (1) and (3) under stage 1 and stage 3 respectively.
Sample selection bias: Heckit method
In equation (2) the dependent variable related to stage 2, LD, is observed only for those who have applied for loans for micro credit at stage 1 of the borrowing process, while it is not observable for those who have decided not to apply. In equation (4) Rejected applicants where LR is the observed loan granted. Applicants under the condition of LS ≥ LD fall into the creditworthy borrowers subgroup, while applicants under the conditions of LS < LD and LS = 0 fall into the partially rationed applicants subgroup and fully rejected subgroup respectively. For estimation purpose, one may tend to ignore the respondents who have decided not to apply for loans in stage 1, and then use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to estimate equation (2) and the TOBIT method 5 to estimate equation (4). But this approach is not workable because the sub-sample (individuals who applied for loans or who have been rationed by lenders) is not random and the observed data are selected by a systematic process, and, therefore results are biased. James Heckman (1979) analyzes the selection bias problem that results from using non-randomly selected samples when estimating a behavioural relationship. In order to overcome this bias problem, he suggests for an alternative estimation method, which has been known as Heckit method. Following this method, two steps estimation has been conducted for each of the two behavioural equations (2) and (4).
Step I: Estimate the PROBIT model of decision equation or selection equation by maximum likelihood estimation method. For each observation in the selected sample, calculate and save the value of the Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR).
Step II: Using the selected sample, regress the dependent variable on the nominated explanatory variables and the Inverse Mill's Ratio. The Inverse Mills Ratio is created from the first step PROBIT estimation and accounts for the fact that the observed sample is not random.
In case of equation (2), firstly, the Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR) of all observations in the selected sample of individuals who have applied for loans are calculated from the PROBIT model in function (1) and secondly, OLS estimation is used to regress LD on its explanatory variables and IMR. 5 The TOBIT method is fully described in Tobin (1958, pp 24-30) .
In case of equation (4), firstly, the Inverse Mill's Ratio (IMR) of all observations in the selected sample of individuals who been rationed are calculated from the PROBIT model in function (3) and secondly, MLE estimation is used to regress LS on its explanatory variables and IMR.
The estimation results
In this section, socio-economic explanatory variables, which reflect the personal characteristics, household characteristics, repayment ability of microentrepreneurs, and many other variables that affect lender's and borrower's decisions, are examined for their effect on the borrowing process of microentrepreneurs. Definitions of such variables, which have been used in this section, are shown in Appendix-I.
Determinants of Applications for Loans (Stage One): PROBIT Model
Function (1) relates the explanatory variables to the probability of applying for micro credit. The explanatory variables that affect the individual's decision include individual's characteristics, the household's characteristics, repayment ability variables that reflect the individual's ability to secure a loan, and other factors affecting the individual's decision such as having social events and responsibilities, religious beliefs, application cost, availability of a lender in local, availability of a mediator, and whether the individual has effective loans.
The results of the first stage PROBIT model, which determine the factors that affect the probability of applying for micro credit, are shown in Appendix-II. It shows that the following variables significantly negatively affect the probability of applying for micro credit (at least at the 5% level). Firstly, employed and male individuals are less likely to apply for micro credit than unemployed and female individuals. This may reflect the males' ability for self-financing or the ability to access other credit markets or lack of demand for micro credit. Females always have less family responsibilities than males and face social barriers in accessing other credit markets. Some times, females become less likely to apply for micro credit when they find themselves out of the target groups of the microfinance providers. Secondly, the use of micro credit to finance social events and responsibilities is low, which decreases the probability of applying for micro credit to finance such events. Individuals perceive no chance of loan approval for such purposes. Thirdly, as application cost increases, the probability of applying for micro credit decreases. This may indicate that application cost is an important component in making borrowing decisions especially when the individual fears loan rejection. Fourthly, the probability of applying for micro credit decreases when the microfinance providers are non-Islamic institutions. Some of these providers have borrowing schemes that take the prohibition of interest rate "usury" into consideration in order to attract religious borrowers. Fifthly, as the value of a household's monetary saving increases, the probability of applying for micro credit decreases. Monetary savings of the household members may work as a substitute for borrowing from external sources specially when all household members live in the family house and keep strong relations between themselves. Lastly, the coefficient of the dummy variable that represents the availability of a guarantor is negative. This type of collateral is not useful specially when the guarantor has no credit history or guarantees other borrowers at the same time. The availability of a guarantor may be more useful in other credit markets.
On the other hand, the following variables have a significant positive effect (at least at the 10% level) on the probability of applying for micro credit. Firstly, being single and having a tendency for being financially independent from family implies more willingness to obtain self-employment loans. This increases the probability of applying for micro credit. Secondly, the head of the household bears the major proportion of the family expenses which reflects additional demand for credit. This reflects the positive sign of the coefficient of the dummy variable that represents being the head of household. Thirdly, having enough knowledge about sources of credit such as banks, microfinance providers and informal lenders, may increase the probability of applying for micro credit if the individual considers microfinance providers as a favourable source of credit from social and religious perspectives.
Individuals are more likely to favour borrowing from microfinance providers when they find themselves among the target group of these institutions. Fourthly, availability of a microfinance provider in local increases the probability of applying for micro credit from this institution. This may reduce the application cost and waiting period for the lender's decision. Fifthly, having an effective loan increases the probability of applying for a new loan to repay other loans or to expand existing businesses. Having more than one loan may indicate good relations with lenders and eligibility.
Increasing age within the (18-24) and the (35-44) age groups increases the probability of applying for micro credit, while the probability decreases as the age increases within the (45-54) age group. This reflects the lender's requirements in relation to age. Some microfinance providers focus on specific age groups or have an age ceiling. If the age of the individual exceeds that of the age ceiling, he or she perceives no chance of loan approval which makes him or her less likely to apply. Years of formal education, whether the individual owns his or her house, the size of the household, having real estate collateral, availability of a mediator, and the size of net total cash flow are found to have no significant affect the probability of applying for micro credit.
Determinants of Demand for Micro Credit (Stage Two): Heckit Method
Equation (2) is the loan demand equation. The interest rate is included to measure price elasticity. The value of the loans received by the applicant from banks and informal lenders measures the degree of complementarity and substitutability between different sources of credit. The value of assets and whether the applicant expects social events and responsibilities measures the need for liquidity. Whether the applicant has minimal equity or not indicates the ability to self-finance. The value of collateral available to secure the loan reflects the applicant's ability to repay the loan and keep a good credit record. When borrowing from microfinance providers, microentrepreneurs pay little attention to the interest rate especially when no other sources of fund are available. The coefficients of assets and value of collateral are positive and significantly related to demand for micro credit. The value of assets as a proxy for the size of business implies high demand for larger enterprises and the value of collateral is a proxy for the ability to secure larger loans. Such variables increase the individual's expectations of receiving larger loans may increase the risk taking attitude of the individual by increasing borrowing. Borrowers with larger minimal equity usually demand larger micro credit. This may reflect the high cost of the project financed by the loan or indicates greater risk taking attitudes by borrowing a larger amount. Results show that no significant difference between demands for micro credit in different regions is found. Applicants operating in the service sector demand smaller loans than those who operate in other sectors and those who operate in the agricultural sector, in particular, demands larger loans. Social events and responsibilities increase the demand for micro credit. Sometimes applicants aim at financing social events and responsibilities by micro credit; this may reflect the significant and positive coefficient of the dummy variable that represents the need of credit for social reasons. The applicants who own their houses demand smaller loans compared to those who live with family or in rented houses. Those who head their households, those who are highly educated and single applicants demand larger loans. The coefficients of the age and the gender of the applicant are insignificant, but they may suggest that older and male borrowers demand smaller loans. The coefficient of Inverse Mill's Ratio in the demand equation is positive but insignificant which may indicate that no sample selection bias really exists in this case. The sign of the coefficient indicates that those are more likely to apply for micro credit in stage one of the borrower process tend to demand larger loans in stage two of the borrowing process.
Determinants of Being Credit Constrained (Stage Three): PROBIT Model
Function (3) relates the explanatory variables to the probability that a lender will ration an applicant's loan demand. As in section 6.1, the explanatory variables that affect the lender's decision include the individual's characteristics, household's characteristics, repayment ability variables, and other factors affecting the lender's decision.
The results of the third stage which analyzes the determinants of being credit constraint are shown in Appendix-IV. Here variables that indicate how the repayment ability of the applicant significantly affects the lender's decision are discussed. Microfinance providers frequently ration applicants with larger leverage of bank and microfinance debt because leverage of debt affects the applicant's commitment toward new loans and may increase default risk. Microfinance providers are also more likely to ration applicants with larger dependency ratios for the same reason. Applicants who experienced a larger number of rejected loan applications in the past are more likely to be rationed in their current loan demand. Leverage of informal debt has no effect on the 11 MFI decision. Informal loans usually are of short maturity and disbursed in small amounts. According to expectations, as the value of collateral and the value of household monetary savings increases, the probability of being rationed decreases. These variables indicate the applicant's ability to secure loans and reduce risk. The negative sign of the dummy variable that represents the ownership of a place of residency confirm the major role of collateral on the lender's decision. The house that the individual owns can be used as collateral. Since most of the microfinance providers mainly grant loans to income generating activities and self-employment projects, loan demand to finance social activities and responsibilities is more frequently rationed. But some applicants may mislead the institution about the purpose of loans. This may explain the positive sign of the dummy that represents the purpose of loans. Agricultural loans are more likely to be rationed especially by non-agricultural oriented institutions. There is only one institutionAgriculture Credit Corporation (ACC) that specializes in agricultural finance. Ineligible applicants who seek agricultural loans in other institutions may be eligible in this institution. Loan demands of older applicants are less frequently rationed, but at an increasing rate. Most of the borrowers are of moderate age. Older and younger individuals borrow relatively little due to age requirements. Heads of households and applicants with higher dependency ratios are more likely to be rationed; this result may be inconsistent with the coefficient of age. Microfinance providers seem to reject any role for mediators; hence they always ration loan demand when mediators intervene in the borrowing process. Borrowers in the northern region are more likely to be rationed; this may reflect the fact that they frequently apply for micro credit or be due to the high population density in this region and the variety of institutions operating in this region. Personal characteristics of an applicant such as sex, years of formal education, marital status, work status are found to have no significant effect on the lender's decision in stage three.
Determinants of Supply of Credit (Stage Four): Heckit Method
Equation (4) is the loan supply equation. It estimates the factors affecting the maximum amount that the lender is willing to lend given the state of knowledge about the applicant and according to its client selection criteria. The interest rate is included to measure the price elasticity, whether the applicant has effective bank and informal loans to measure ability to repay new loans, maturity of loans to test the preference of lenders for maturity periods, the value of total assets and the value of collateral to reflect the applicant's ability to secure the loan and liquidate to meet the loan repayments, region and sector variables to reflect the lender's preferences between different regions and sectors according to risk, years of experience to reflect the applicant's rationality and management capability, whether the applicant has minimal equity to reflect his or her seriousness, whether the applicant has social events and responsibilities to reflect the purpose of the loan and the expected returns of the loan, and other factors and personal characteristics to reflect the type of applicant such as age, sex, whether the applicant owns his or her house, years of formal education, dependency ratio, and being a head of the household.
In order to correct for sample selection bias that may result from excluding those who didn't apply for loans, the IMR is used as an additional regressor in the loan supply equation (equation 4). The IMR is calculated for each observation of the selected sample (those who applied for loans). If the coefficient of the IMR is found to be significant, sample selection bias is really exists and including the IMR as an additional regressor is relevant and increases efficiency. In the contrary, insignificant effect of IMR indicates no sample selection bias is detected. A negative sign of the coefficient of IMR in the loan supply equation (equation 4) indicates that lenders grant smaller loan amounts to those who are found to be more likely to be rationed.
The results of the fourth stage which analyzes the determinants of the maximum amount a microfinance provider is willing to lend given the state of knowledge about the borrower, are shown in Appendix-V. As expected, the interest rate coefficient is positive and significant indicating that microfinance providers are willing to supply larger loans at higher interest rates. Microfinance providers are more inclined to favour the disbursement of longer maturity loans; this may reflect the attempt to reduce transaction costs and the social objectives of these providers. Microfinance providers lend larger amounts to applicants who have a larger value of assets and collateral since they demand larger loans as shown in stage two of the borrowing process. They also disburse larger loans for borrowers who have effective loans since they demand larger loans. Microfinance providers lend larger amounts to those with extensive experience in business because years of experience reflect management capability, rationality and reduce the business failure risk. They also tend to grant larger loans to applicants with higher minimal equity because it indicates more seriousness. Sector of operation and region have no significant effect on micro credit disbursed since each lender has its own target group and target sector. This indicates that a large number of institutions specialize in specific regions and development of specific sectors. Older borrowers receive larger amounts of micro credit but at a decreasing rate. MFI loans to those who head their households and who own their houses are smaller than to their counterparts. Other personal characteristic variables such as gender, years of formal education and dependency ratio have no significant effect on the amount disbursed. Using a loan for social purpose doesn't affect the loan granted by a lender to a specific borrower, especially if that loan is highly secured by collateral. The coefficient of IMR in the supply equation in the microfinance market is positive but insignificant which may indicate that no sample selection bias really exists in this case. The sign of the coefficient is questionable since it shows that microfinance providers grant larger loans in stage four to those who are more likely to be rationed in stage two.
Conclusions
The socio-economic determinants of the borrowers' and lenders' behaviours in four stages of the borrowing process have been examined. Those who are single microentrepreneurs, those who head their households, those who are familiar with larger numbers of the microfinance providers, those who have local microfinance provider, those who currently have effective loans, and those whose age is increasing in the (18-24) and the (35-44) age groups have been found to be more likely to apply for micro credit from a microfinance The microfinance providers consider the value of collateral and monetary savings as criteria for rationing credit. Those who head their households, those who are located in the northern region, those with higher dependency ratio, those with larger leverage of debt, those with larger number of rejected applications in the past, those who have social responsibilities, those who apply for productive loans, and those who have a mediator are more likely to be rationed by the microfinance providers. On the other hand, those who are older applicants, those who own their place of residency, those with higher value of collateral, and those with higher value of monetary savings are less likely to be rationed by the microfinance providers. Heads of households and those who have social responsibilities are more likely to be rationed by the microfinance providers not because lenders discriminate against such groups but because they more often apply for micro credit. On the other hand, those who have higher values of monetary savings tend to apply less frequently for micro credit and thus are less likely to be rationed.
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The microfinance providers grant larger loans to those who are willing to pay higher interest rates, those who have more assets, higher value of collateral, minimal equity, effective loans, and more experience. The older applicants receive larger loans but loans amount become smaller and smaller as their age increases more and more
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. The microfinance providers tend to grant larger loans to those who have received bank loans in the past, those who have more assets and collateral and those who have minimal equity; this is because they tend to demand larger loans than their counterparts. Those who own their houses receive smaller loans because they demand smaller loans. Although social events and responsibilities result in an increase in the demand for micro credit, but these may not affect the amount granted by microfinance providers.
The most interesting result that we obtain confirms our conjecture that the non-economic factors like religious belief, social events and associated social responsibilities do play very significant role, specifically in the demand side of the borrowing process, in an Islamic country like Jordan. 
Definitions of Variables

Determinants of Applying for Micro Credit
